COGNITIVE SKILLS IN PHILOSOPHY A Teacher's Guide Steven James Bartlett, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy Saint Louis University KEYWORDS: cognitive skills in philosophy, problem-solving, Piagetian learning cycles, protocol analysis, conceptual therapy ABSTRACT wo fundamentally distinct approaches to the teaching of philosophy are contrasted: On the one hand, there is the "information-oriented" approach which has dominated classrooms and which emphasizes the understanding of historically important philosophical works. On the other hand, there is the "cognitive skills" approach. The two approaches may be distinguished under the headings of 'knowing that' as opposed to 'knowing how'. This paper describes and discusses four perspectives relating to the teaching of cognitive skills: (i) the discovery-oriented approach, (ii) Piagetian learning cycles, (iii) protocol analysis, and (iv) conceptual therapy. The latter approach reflects the author's interest in helping students to develop "therapeutic" skills that enable them to identify and eliminate concepts which they employ in their thinking and which are incompatible with their own presuppositional bases and are therefore selfrefuting. _________________________________________ This paper was originally published in Aitia, Winter, 1978-1979, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 12-21. It is here made available with an accompanying abstract and internet-searchable keywords. The author has chosen to issue this paper as a free open access publication under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license, which allows anyone to distribute this work without changes to its content, provided that both the author and the original URL from which this work was obtained are mentioned, that the contents of this work are not used for commercial purposes or profit, and that this work will not be used without the author's or his executor's permission in derivative works (i.e., you may not alter, transform, or build upon this work without such permission). The full legal statement of this license may be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode © Steven James Bartlett 2020 T COGNfflVE SKILLS IN PHILOSOPHY: A TEACHER'S GUIDE by Steven J. Bartlett, Dept. of Philosophy Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, Missouri There are two fundamentally distinct approaches to the teaching of philosophy. One, which I shal I refer to as the "I nformation-oriented" approach, has dominated the classroom, and has emphasized the history of philosophy through textual explication, comparison of the views of major thinkers, study of movements, etc. The other, which I t I s au courant to cal I a "cognitive ski I ls" approach to philosophy, also has Its roots In a long history, but has usually been subordinated to ac- quisition of I nformation about the phi losophlcal tradition. The two kinds of knowtedge which the two approaches achieve have come to be distinguished under the general headings of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how1.l It Is not my Intent In this short paper to recommend that one form of knowledge should supercede the other, nor Is It my concern to explore what I belleve Is a mutually Interdependent relatlonshlp between them. What I do wish to do Is to Identify and describe brlefly a group of practlca l and Innovative approaches to the teaching of philosophy from the "cognitive skills" perspective. The prlnctpa l and general concern of a cognitive skills approach to philosophy Is with thinking wel I: I t assumes that no one thinks as wet I as he might, and I t believes that thinking better ts a worthwhl !e goal. The cognitive ski I Is peculiar to philosophers when they think wel I have not often been made an expllclt subject of lnvestlgatlon, 2 stl I I less has attention been devoted to I dentifying effective ways of fostering and Improving these ski I Is I n the classroom, which I s my Interest here. It would doubtless be desirable if we could divide our subject and then conquer It Qas-a-pas, perhaps f lrst by recognizing certain cognitive ski I I s as speclflcal ly phi losophlcal, then by. suggesting appropriate Aitia, Winter 78-79, Vol. 6, No. 3 12 13 ways to teach these ski I Is. In real tty, however, the task of arguing that there exist peculiarly phi losophlcal patterns of thought Is Itself a phi losophlcal one, which wt I I doubtless reveal I n Its own accomplishment -with e loquent ref lexive- ness -patterns of the kind I t proposes to uncover, If such there be. Reluctantly, I must put to one side for the present the Interesting questions such a task raises. There are various general approaches to the teaching of cognitive skills .which may be of va lue to the cognitive ski I ls-oriented phi losopher to assist him .both In attaining a knowledge concerning such ski I Is, and In transmitting them to his students. I propose, In other words, to side-step altogether the need to show that there exist spectflcal ly phi losophlca l cognitive skll I s, although I am persuaded that there are. I wish to advance hypothetically: lf there are skt I Is of this variety, what practical approaches are available which may be useful to the teacher who ts thinking of working wlth a cog- nitive ski I Is approach to philosophy? {There are two ration- ales for this way of proceeding: First of al I, It simp lifies matters. And secondly, tt seems likely that one or more of the approaches described would be presupposed by any pht loso- pher who attempts to determine the truth of the hypothesis.) If we adopt the ultimate moral of Barth's distinction <"There are two types of people: those who divide people In- to two types, and those who don�t.") , we may wish to divide philosophy approached.from a cogntttve skills perspective In twos On the one hand, we may hypothesize that there are those phi losophers who are deeply disappointed by the dlsctp I lne's track record over the past two thousand years, since It appears that few, If any, genuinely phi losophlca l truths have been dlscov�red which lend themselves to acceptance with- out controversy. Among the cognitive ski I Is which such a sclentlflcal ly I nclined philosopher would very like ly value are those of rigorous, deductive thinking. On the other hand, there are those philosophers who do not choose to regard the absence of non-c�ntroverstal results as exhibiting a fat lure on the part of pht losophy, and In fact suggest that co�troversy I I . . Is the essence of the discipline, and that lt wo11ld be a mistake to wish for final phi losophlcal solu�lons. 4 Such a dlalectlclan ls apt to value ski I I s In argumentation which lead to self-knowledge, that Is to say, to a fuller conception of one's self, of one's basic corrvnlt ments. Flnal ly, the maker of bridges between scientific philosophy and dlalectlcal philosophy may value, e.g., ski I I s In non-controversial de- ductive argumentation which lead to an enriched sense of self- Identity. I n a plurallstlc tolerance of spirit ("different strokes for different folks") , the fol lowing practical teaching approaches offer themselves; In principle, they are mutually supporting and can accompdate such an hypothesized variety of phi losophlcal cognitive ski I I s. THE DISCOVERY-ORIENTED APPROACH This I s probably the most ancient approach to the teach- ing of phi losophlcal habits of mind, one which Is now assuming a more clearly defined and hence more east ly Implemented form. In unmistakable and unselfconscious Imitation of the�. George Polya has explored a ski I I -based, discovery-oriented approach to teaching through dlalogue.5 Polya's subject-matter is mathematics, but his frequently Insightful suggestions and question-asking strategies can east ly be extended to apply within a deductive or dlalectlcal conception of phi los- ophy. When successful In using Polya's approach. one can ex- pect rapid growth of heuristic self-conciousness I n students, which wl I I enable them to discover with enthusiasm so lutions or arguments slml lar to those developed In class, A disadvan- tage often encountered Is that the discovery-oriented approach can consume excessive class time In exchange for the results reached CMeno's slave-boy doggedly comes to mind) , and the ap- proach can discourage students who feel lost and Insecure In the open-textured search for a solution or 1 llumlnatlng question, LEARN I NG CYCLES I nfluenced by the work of the Swiss psychologist, Jean 14 Piaget, Karplus and others have worked out a format for learning which seeks to up-�rade the level of reasoning of the student to flt the set of problems or questions to be studled.6 Learning cycles consist of an lnltlal phase of exploratlon Ca relatlvely unstruct�red exposure to problems that share certain common features), a phase of invention Crecognttton and lsolatton of useful ways to treat these problems), and a phase of application (extending what has been learned to new problem situations). Learning cycles do* work.7 At the same time, they are sometimes judged, like Polya's approach, to be overly time-consuming, making It difficult to cover the material expected of a given course. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS It has proved useful Jn the field of arttflclal Intel- . llgence to ask a human subject to describe verbally how he approaches and undertakes the successful solution to a 16 problem. Hts verbal report, or P.rotocol, can then be ana- lyzed, broken down Into "sub-routines", and used as a basis to generate a set of step-by-step Instructions which, when fol lowed by a machine, produces slml lar results. Protocol analysts ls useful because It makes explfclt how a model subject thinks; students are able to learn cognitive ski I Is effectively tn this way.a One's Interest tn analyzing proto- cols may be In addressing problems which demand either solutions that can be attained algorlthmlcal ly (I.e., by fol lowing a sequence of precise Instructions), or * problems that demand "creattve solutlons"--namely, those which cannot be reached by means of known algorlthms.9 Advantages of protocol analysis • Include: a more active tapping of human resources In the classroom as attention Is widened to Include lndlvlduals other than the Instructor; ease with which students can Identify with peers and, derlvatlvely, with their patterns of thinking; and the degree of comprehensive analysts of a problem, technique, or view, given the demand for complete explication of on�'s thought process. The principal disadvantage lies In the fact that students must often be taught . . ' . how to reach the degree of explicitness that Is requested In their self-reports: verbally articulate models are essential, and not always avaf fable In an lndfvfdual class. CONCEPTUAL THERAPY We accept the notion that people occasional ty need therapy--emotlonal, physical, occupatlonal, etc. As philosophers, we are aware of the notion, but are perhaps less accustomed to lt,fhat In our use of concepts we may also at times need therapy. The phi losophlcal claim, whlth stf I I echoes In Plato's cave, has been variously expressed. Wittgenstein spoke of files and fly-bottfes and Ryle of category mistakes; logicians have exposed numerous kinds of fal lacfes: the positivists labelled and rejected what they perceived as meaningless. Some revisionists have been languageand some concept-conscious. If our Interest Is In how well our students may come to think, ft Is natural to speak of conceptual therapy, although no less Is It Important that they be able to express their thoughts In language, which Is, after al I, the main (and often the only) basis we have to ascertain quality of thinking. Gregory Bateson, . a left-handed, truly original psycho- therapist, has been concerned with what he terms "pathologies of eplstemology11• 10 Toulmln has coined the word 'cerebroses' to refer to conceptual neuroses. I I John Wisdom treats Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a kind of Intellectual psychoanalysts. 12 If we take seriously the general message such authors express, we would find, as teachers of phi losophlcal ski I Is, Interesting and useful para I lels wfthlry psychotherapy-- approaches, that Is to say, to psychotherapy and to the train- ing of therapists which para I lel already artlculated Interests In philosophy conceived as conceptual therapy, For example, consider the Indirect approach to therapy of Rogers, which refrains from Imposing on a patient external norms of behavior, but provides a context In which, e.g., self16 17 defeating behaviors may be Identified and transcended by the patient himself. Such an approach to therapy dramat- tcal ly para I lels In many ways the ad homlnem style of phllosophlcal argumentation, which.ls effective because It accepts one's epponent's position as It ls expressed by him. "Instead of looklng for a counter-example, one ... must suppose that the man means exactly what he says; • • • no thinker refutes himself unless we help him to do so by taking him sertously." 3 From such an Indirect stance of Intellectual Ju�o, val Id phllosophlcal criticism must be I nterna I • 14 From another point of view, Albert Eiits has proposed a direct, confrontation-oriented approach to psychotherapy. External norms are applied almost without compunction, to help shake the patient free from the self-defeating ruts of his own perceptions, and thereby enable him to view hls own problems from the ratlonal frame of reference of the thera- pis.t. Here, too, phl losophlcal styles of arqumentatlon parallel many aspects of such a rational approach to therapy. For example, Ch. Perelman 1 s locus for philosophical argumentation is found Jn hls conception of "unlversal audience", characterized by our adherence to fundamental tenets of rationality. Transcendental arguments attempt to underscore conditions which must be granted 1n order for objective knowledge (Kant>, Identification of partlculars CStrawson), or discourse <Passmore) to be possible. From such a point of view, one's phi losophlcal Interest Is In statements which one cannot not accept without self-referential Inconsistency. There Is a growing llterat�re devoted to exploring this approach to argumentation. It ls common Jn psychotherapy to regard as pathologlcal a person's "rigid commitments to patterns of Jnconslstency.1116 Similarly, philosophy undertaken as conceptual therapy can serve both to Identify concepts (or expressions) which are Jncompatlble with their own presupposltlonal bases, and wayT of using concepts (or expressions) which are self-refuting. 7 In both cases, It ts clear that philosophy may be pursued llterally as a form of conceptual therapy. The teaching of such therapeutic skills th philosophy closely resembles, I am led to believe, the teachlnq of psychotherapeutic ski I ts. A translatlon--from the world of psychotherapy to the concerns of phi losophy--must be made by the I ndividual teacher of philosophy as conceptual therapy. I t requires, llke any teaching Innovation, Imagination and fortitude. I n sunvnary, I have described four perspectives which may be useful to a cognitive ski Its approach to philosophy. The I nterested reader wl I I discover many posstbl lltles for orlglnal Innovation I n the literature, via the chain-reaction which usually occurs whenever one begins to consult ref- erences I n a new area of study. Even *the teaching strategies Identified here can themselves serve as phi losophlcal ly Interesting models: Polya's approach considered as a modern attempt to understand dlalectlc, learning cycles as a more systematic way to comprehend concept-formation In develop- menta I terms, protocol analysis as a form of applied phenom- enology, and conceptual therapy as a promising f leld for revisionary I nternal and external phi losophlcal criticism. An adequate phi losophlcal theory which would shed light on the teaching of cognitive ski tis I n phi lsophy I s, lfke many Instances of complex ref lexlvtty, dizzyingly self-referential, yet I ts development possesses a fascination of Its own. NOTES I. Since the pub I I cation of Gt lbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (N. Y. a Barnes and Noble 1949), Chapter I t. 2. Two excellent works on phi losophlcal argumentation exist: Henry w. Johnstone, Jr. , Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Pa. : Pennsylvanla State University Press 1959) and John Passmore, Phi losophlcal Reasoning CN.Y. : Charles Scribners Sons 196 1). A col lectlon of papers which shares this focus has been edited by Johnstone and Maurice Natanson, Ph 1 1 osophy, Rhetort c, and Argumentat I on <Un Ivers I ty Park, Pa,: 18 Pennsylvania State University Press 1965) . The endless stream of*works on formal and Informal logic Is less directly relevant, since formal and Informal reasoning, though used by philosophers, are not peculiar to phi losophlcal thinking. 3. Russell's famous tine comes to mind: "Philosophy, from the earliest times, h�s made greater clalms, and achieved fewer results, than any other branch of learning. " (Our Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen and Unwln 1926) , p. 13. ) Edmund Husserl voiced the same dist I lustonment: "The Imperfection of philosophy ts of an entirely different sort from that of the other sciences • • • It does not have at Its disposal a merely Incomplete and, In particular Instances, Imperfect doctrinal system; It slmply has none whatever. Each and every question ls herein controverted, every position ls a matter of Individual conviction, of the Interpretation given by a school, of a "point of vlew". "<'Phl losophy as Rigorous Sctencett In Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer CN.Y. : Harper and Row 1965) , p.75.) 4. Johnstone, for example, sees a fundamental misunderstand- ing of the phi losophlcal enterprise In the criticism that, In philosophy, general assent has never been achieved. Cf. Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, passim. See also Ryle's "Proofs*ln Philosophy", Revue lnternatlonale de Phi losophle VII I (1954) , 150-157; Johnstone's "The Nature of Phi losophlcal Controversy", Journa I of Ph I losophy 5 I ( 1954) , 294-300; and other works by Johnstone listed In the bibliography In Johnstone and Natanson's col lectlon mentioned In note 2, above. 5. George Polya, How to Solve ..!.:!:_(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press 1945) ; Mathematics and Plauslble Reasoning, 2 vols. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press 1954>� Mathematica! Discovery: On Understanding Learning and Teaching Problem Solvlng CN. Y. : John WI ley 1962 (Vol. I) , 1965 CVol. kl) ) . For related views and ref�rences to the literature, see Bartlett, "A Metatheoretlcal Basis for Interpretations of Problem Solving Behavior", Methodology and Science I I ( 1978) , 19 . . . I 59-85; Bart I ett, "Protoco I Ana I fs ls l n Creative Problem Solving", The Journal of Creative Behavior Ctn press); and contributions In Robert S. Cohen, Paul K. Feyerabend, and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds. , Essays .!.n. Memory of lmre Lakatos, Boston Studies ln the Philosophy of Science XXX I X (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel 1976). 6. For a review of the I lterature, see Bartlett, "Protocol Analysts In Creative Problem Solvlng", .The Journal of Creative Behavior Ctn press) . On the use of learning cycles ln philosophy, cf. E. T. Carpenter, "A Place for Philosophy ln the ADAPT Program", University of Nebraska Lincoln, ADAPT (Accent .Q.!l Developing Abstract Processes of Thought) Program, monograph report, 1976. 7. See, e. g. , A. B. Arons, "Culttvatlng the Capacity for Formal Reasoning: Objectives and Procedures In an I ntroductory Physical Science Course", American Journal of Physics 44 (1976) 834-838; University of Nebraska Llncoln, lQJ.Q..; Anton E. Lawson and John W. Renner, �A Quantltatlve Analysis of Re- sponses to Plagetlan Tasks and I ts I mplications for Curriculum� Science Education 58 ( 1974), 545-560. 8. See Bartlett, "fhe Use of Protocol Analysis Jn Philosophy", Metaphl losophy Ctn press) , and "Protocol Analysis Jn Creative Problem Solving", (see note 6) , and A. Whlmbey, I ntelligence Can Be Taught CN. Y. : E. P. Dutton 1975). 9. For referencesto the literature, see Bartlett, �Protocol Analysis In Creative Problem Solving", The Journal of Creative Behavior Ctn Press>, and Bartlett, "A Class Jn Phi losophlcal I nquiry" In A. Whlmbey, A Cognitive Ski I I s Approach to the DJ sc Ip 1 1 nes , . CUE Project Techn I ca I Serl es, Bow I I ng Green State University, 1977. I 0, Gregory Bateson, Steps !g, !.!l Eco I ogy 91 .t1..U!s!. C N, Y. : Ballantfne 1972), Part V I . 20 21 I I . Stephen E. Toulmln, ''From loglcal Analysls to Conceptual History", I n P. Achlnsteln and S. Barker, eds., The Legacy of Loglcal Positivism (Boston: Johns Hopkins Press 1969) • p. 45. 12. John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1953) . 13. Henry W. Johnstqne, Jr., "Self-Refutation and Valldlty", The Monist XLVI I I Cl964) pp. 483-484. 14. Richard M. Zaner, "Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Crltlcal Discussion", Philosophy and Rhetoric I ( 1968) pp. 61-77. 15. See, for example, Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument; Passmore, Phi losophlcal Reasoning; J. M. Boyle, Jr., "Self- Referentlal I nconsistency, I nevitable Falsity, and Metaphysical Argumentation", Metaphl losophy 3 ( 1972) , 25-42; and Bartlett, "The I dea of a Metaloglc of Reference", Methodology and Science 9 (1976) , 85-92. 16. G. Bateson, "Minimal Requirements for a Theory of Schlzophrenta"ln Bateson, I bid., p. 263. 17. This distinction fol lows that made between meta log lea I and pragmatical self-referential I nconsistency. On the latter, see, for example, c. K. Grant, "Pragmatlcal lmpllca- tlon", Philosophy XXX I I I (1958) , 303-324; on the former, see Bartlett, "The I dea of a Metaloglc of Reference", Methodology and Science 9 ( 1976) . * � I OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THE AUTHOR VARIOUSLY RELATED TO THE TOPIC OF THIS PAPER A freely downloadable collection of publications by the author, including many of the publications listed here, is available from the author's university research website: http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet and from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/s/Steven%20James%20Bartlett. BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS 1. A Relativistic Theory of Phenomenological Constitution: A Self-Referential, Transcendental Approach to Conceptual Pathology. (Vol. I: French; Vol. II: English. Doctoral dissertation, Université de Paris, 1970.) Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARART-7. 2. Conceptual Therapy: An Introduction to Framework-relative Epistemology, Studies in Theory and Behavior, Saint Louis, 1983. An introductory text that gives students applied exercises in thinking using the author's approach to epistemology in terms of self-referential argumentation and self-validating proofs. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARCTA-11 3. Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity, edited with Peter Suber, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; now published by Springer Science. The first of two collections (see #4 below), consisting of invited papers by leading contemporary authors, to be published in the new area of research, the general theory of reflexivity, pioneered by the author. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARSRO-4 4. Reflexivity: A Source Book in Self-Reference, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1992. The second collection, consisting of classical papers by leading contributors of the twentieth century, published in the new area of research, the general theory of reflexivity. 5. The Pathology of Man: A Study of Human Evil, published in 2005 by behavioral science publisher Charles C. Thomas, is the first comprehensive scholarly study of the psychology and epistemology of human aggression and destructiveness. The study includes original research by the author, such as a detailed description of the phenomenology of hatred and the psychology of human stupidity, and an extension and elaboration of the author's earlier published work dealing with the epistemology of human thought disorders (Part III). 6. Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards of Good Psychological Health. Praeger, 2011. The first book-length scholarly critique of the widespread and unexamined presumption that psychological normality should be employed as a standard for good mental health. Contains some discussion related to framework-relativity. 7. The Species Problem and its Logic: Inescapable Ambiguity and Framework-relativity. (Research monograph, 2015) Available from arXiv.org: (http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.01589), in England from CogPrints: (http://cogprints.org/9956/), in France from the Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe's HAL: (https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01196519), and in the U.S. from PhilSci (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11655/ ). 8. Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning. Book in progress. To be made available online as a free downloadable open access publication. Check the author's homepage http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet. ARTICLES 9. "Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science," Methodology and Science, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1980, 143-167. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARSPA-20 10. "Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning," Synthèse, Vol. 52, 1982, 267-282. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARRCA 11. "Philosophy as Conceptual Therapy," Educational Resources Information Center, National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, May, 1983, Document #ED 224 402. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARPAC-18 12. "Hoisted by Their Own Petards: Philosophical Positions that Self-Destruct," Argumentation, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1988, 69-80. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARHBT 13. "Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks," Animal Law (law review of the Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College), Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 143-76. The first comprehensive legal study of the psychological and epistemological foundations of human resistance to the compassionate treatment of animals. Contains an application of the author's self-referential argumentation to human conceptual blocks that stand in the way of the recognition of animal rights. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/JAMROH-2 14. "Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks," electronically re-published October, 2002, by the Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, Animal Law Web Center, and maintained on an ongoing basis: http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arussbartlett2002.htm 15. Also available in German: "Wurzeln menschlichen Widerstands gegen Tierrechte: Psychologische und konceptuelle Blockaden," German translation of the preceding paper by Gita Y. Arani-May. Electronically published on the following websites in September, 2003: http://www.tierrechts.net/Animal_Law_Roots_of_Human_Resistance_to_An imal_Rights.pdf http://www.veganswines.de/Animal_Law/ http://animallaw.info/articles/arussbartlett2002.htm 16. Also available in Portuguese: "Raízes da resistência humana aos direitos dos animais: Bloqueios psicológicos e conceituais," published in Brazilian Animal Rights Review (Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal), Vol. 2(3), July/December, 2007 [actually appeared in 2008], pp. 17-66. 17. "Paratheism: A Proof that God neither Exists nor Does Not Exist." 2016. Available from PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/BARPAP-20.